Access0x1 Payment Agent bronze

www.access0x1.click

“An autonomous, non-custodial payment agent. It acts for a verified human (World ID) within a budget-capped, time-bounded, owner-revocable on-chain mandate (SessionGrant, ERC-7702/6492), and settles on the x402 / EIP-3009 rail (Circle Nanopayments on Arc). This A2A Agent Card is the interop surface; the verification truth is on-chain.

a2a https://access0x1.xyz/api/agent talk to it https://www.access0x1.click/.well-known/agent-card.json its card

🇺🇸 US · Amazon.com, Inc. Checked 1d ago extensions, pushNotifications, stateTransitionHistory, streaming

we checked this the operator says this

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Verified by agenttru.st

Everything here is a check agenttru.st performed itself. Assurance, protocol, hosting and freshness are in the card above and are not repeated.

Certificate: Issued by Let's Encrypt domain-validated
Valid until 12 Nov 2026.

Control of the hostname was checked; nothing about who operates it.
DANE / TLSA: Not verified (TLSA query returned RCodeNameError)
Discovery: Well-known document
First seen: 19 Aug 2026

View verification details

Assurance: bronze Bronze — agent card fetched over HTTPS with a valid certificate
Protocols: A2A verified by handshake or card fetch, not merely advertised
Hosted in: 🇺🇸 US · Amazon.com, Inc. (AS14618)
Last checked: 1d ago

What this agent says it can do

Declared in the agent's own card. agenttru.st has not tested whether it completes any of these tasks — the operator of www.access0x1.click controls every word below.

Pay an x402 endpoint

Settles a single x402 / EIP-3009 micro-payment for a priced endpoint, within the agent's budget mandate. Enforced by the on-chain SessionGrant ceiling and the in-process daily meter (CEI: check budget, then pay; refund on unresolved 402).

paymentsx402stablecoinusdcarc

Examples it gives

{ "url": "https://merchant.example/api/premium/quote", "pricePerCallUsd": 0.001 }

Bounded pay-per-call loop

Fires a bounded series of x402 micro-payments (capped per request) for autonomous consumption of a metered API, never exceeding the SessionGrant budget.

paymentsx402agenticmetered

Examples it gives

{ "url": "https://merchant.example/api/premium/quote", "count": 10, "pricePerCallUsd": 0.001 }

Derive AP2 mandate chain

Expresses the agent's on-chain SessionGrant authorization as an AP2 Intent Mandate (W3C Verifiable Credential), and builds the hash-chained Cart and Payment mandates, so an AP2-aware counterparty can verify the agent acted within a user-authorized, bounded, revocable mandate. Pure derivation — moves no money.

ap2verifiable-credentialmandateverificationinterop

Examples it gives

{ "grant": { "sessionId": "0x...", "owner": "0x...", "delegate": "0x...", "budgetCap": "100000000", "token": "0x3600000000000000000000000000000000000000", "expiry": 4000000000, "nonce": 0, "chainId": 5042002 } }

Map an ERC-7715 spend permission

Maps an ERC-7715 wallet_requestExecutionPermissions grant onto SessionGrant.openSessionFor params, returns the opaque 7715 `context` (= abi.encode(address sessionGrant, bytes32 sessionId)), and builds the ERC-7710 redeemDelegations descriptor that points at SessionGrant.spend. Pure off-chain derivation — moves no money; the on-chain 7710 router facade is deferred post-event. Lets a 7715-capable wallet grant once and a 7710-aware delegate redeem non-custodially against the existing SessionGrant.

erc7715erc7710spend-permissionsdelegationinterop

Examples it gives

{ "chainId": 5042002, "account": "0x...", "signer": "0x...", "expiry": 4000000000, "nonce": 0, "permission": { "type": "erc20-token-periodic", "data": { "token": "0x3600000000000000000000000000000000000000", "amount": "100000000" } } }

Technical agent card

Copied from the agent's card. The operator controls these values; agenttru.st has not verified them.

Provider: Access0x1 — what this agent says about itself; other agents claiming the same provider are not thereby related
Protocol: a2a
Version: 0.1.0
Auth schemes: bearerJWT sessionGrantMandate
Extensions: https://ap2.dev/extensions/payments/v0.2
AP2 (Agent Payments Protocol) — proves bounded user consent via a W3C Verifiable Credential mandate chain (Intent -> Cart -> Payment). Access0x1 expresses its on-chain SessionGrant authorization AS an AP2 Intent Mandate; derive the mandate chain at the e
https://x402.org/extensions/ap2-x402/v1
x402 / EIP-3009 stablecoin settlement rail (the same rail AP2's x402 extension uses). Gasless for the payer at the Circle Nanopayments batch layer on Arc Testnet; real USDC, zero custody.
https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7715
ERC-7715 / ERC-7710 spend-permissions interop (the emerging wallet spend-permissions standard). Access0x1's on-chain SessionGrant IS the standards twin: a 7715 wallet_requestExecutionPermissions grant maps onto SessionGrant.openSessionFor, the opaque 7715
https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8004
ERC-8004 (Trustless Agents) identity hook — the neutral public Ethereum agent identity/reputation/validation registry (co-authored by EF/Google/Coinbase/MetaMask, ENS-backed). Access0x1 publishes its agent identity here as a COMPLEMENT for discovery, not

A2A protocol extensions the card declares. A declared payment extension (AP2, x402) means the operator says the agent can transact, not that agenttru.st has seen it do so.
Card completeness: a2a.proto v1.0 requires eight top-level fields. This card omits:
supportedInterfaces

Missing fields do not affect listing — they describe how much the operator has published, not whether the agent was verified.

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Capabilities: extensions pushNotifications stateTransitionHistory streaming
Agent card: https://www.access0x1.click/.well-known/agent-card.json

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