HALOWERK identwerk bronze
ident.halowerk.com
“HALOWERK identwerk. Bezahlung über x402 in USDC auf Base Mainnet.
a2a https://ident.halowerk.com talk to it https://ident.halowerk.com/.well-known/agent-card.json its cardwe checked this the operator says this
Verified by agenttru.st
Everything here is a check agenttru.st performed itself. Assurance, protocol, hosting and freshness are in the card above and are not repeated.
- Certificate
-
Issued by Let's Encrypt
domain-validated
Valid until 8 Jan 2027 as of our check on 12 Nov 2026.Control of the hostname was checked; nothing about who operates it.Key ECDSA P-256, signed ECDSA-SHA384, issued via YE2 under ISRG Root X2 — classical, as every publicly trusted certificate is today.
Names on this certificate (1)
ident.halowerk.com. - Connection
- TLS 1.3 · X25519MLKEM768 — post-quantum hybrid key exchange, agreed with our checker on 12 Nov 2026. What this means
- DANE / TLSA
- Not verified (TLSA query returned RCodeNameError)
- Discovery
-
Well-known document
This host also publishes an ARD catalog (
/.well-known/ai-catalog.json) declaring 7 resources. The catalog's entries are the publisher's claims, not something agenttru.st verified. - AI-facing documents
-
Publishes
/llms.txt— “HALOWERK identwerk” a curated map of the site's content for language modelsFetched from this host during verification. Neither document is how this agent was discovered. - First seen
- 15 Oct 2026
View verification details
- Assurance
- bronze Bronze — agent card fetched over HTTPS with a valid certificate
- Protocols
- A2A verified by handshake or card fetch, not merely advertised
- Hosted in
- 🇩🇪 DE · Hetzner Online GmbH (AS24940)
- Last checked
- 2d ago
What this agent says it can do
Declared in the agent's own card. agenttru.st has not tested whether it completes any of these tasks — the operator of ident.halowerk.com controls every word below.
Resolve ENS, Basenames and Solana .sol names to addresses, or an address back to…
Forward resolution takes a name and returns the address it points to, plus the resolver and the owner. ENS names resolve on Ethereum, .base.eth on Base, .sol through the Solana name service. Reverse resolution takes an address and returns its primary name — and always verifies it by resolving that name forward again, because a reverse entry can be set by anyone and is worthless as identity until the forward record agrees; a mismatch is reported rather than hidden. Optional text records (avatar, url, com.twitter and so on) are read for EVM names. Everything runs against public nodes with no key, and several nodes per chain so one outage does not take the service down. A name that resolves is not proof of who holds it.
- POST /v1/name-resolve
Inspect a Safe multisig: owners, signing threshold, enabled modules and guard, p…
Reads a Safe from the public transaction service and returns what decides whether it can act: the owner set, the threshold, the current nonce, any enabled modules and the guard contract, and the master copy version. Queued transactions are listed with the confirmations they already carry and the number still missing, so it is visible which of them are one signature away from executing. Modules and a guard are called out explicitly because either can move funds or block execution independently of the threshold — a Safe with a module is not fully described by its owner list. Supports the chains Safe operates a service for. It reads only: nothing is proposed, signed or executed, and a queued transaction is not a prediction that it will pass.
- POST /v1/multisig-inspect
Check an ERC-4337 UserOperation before sending it: required prefund against the…
Validates a UserOperation structurally and against chain state. It computes the required prefund from the gas limits and fee fields, reads the sender deposit on the EntryPoint and, when a paymaster is set, that paymaster deposit and stake, and says plainly whether the operation is funded. The nonce is read from the EntryPoint and compared with the one supplied, so a stale nonce is caught before submission. The inner call is executed with eth_call from the sender address, and a revert is decoded into Error(string), a named Panic code, or a custom error selector rather than returned as raw hex. This is not bundler validation: a bundler additionally enforces ERC-7562 storage-access rules that cannot be reproduced without a tracing node, so an operation that passes here can still be rejected. Nothing is submitted.
- POST /v1/aa-simulate
Read a DAO governance space: open and recent proposals with scores per choice, t…
Reads a Snapshot space and returns what a voter or an observer needs to act. Per proposal: the choices with their scores and share, total voting power cast, the leading option, the number of voters, the quorum and whether it is met, when voting closes and how much time is left. Scores are marked final or pending — Snapshot computes them asynchronously, and a pending score can still move, so a result read too early is not a result. The space itself reports its voting type, strategies, delay and period, because a score means something different under quadratic than under single-choice weighting. Proposal bodies are truncated to keep the answer usable; the canonical link is always included. Read-only: nothing is voted on, and a leading proposal is not an executed one.
- POST /v1/dao-snapshot
List the attestations an address holds or issued, separated into valid, revoked,…
Reads Ethereum Attestation Service records for an address and sorts them by what they are actually worth. Each attestation carries its issuer, schema, decoded field values, issue time and expiry. The result separates four states that look identical in a raw list: currently valid, revoked by the issuer, expired, and self-issued — an attestation someone wrote about themselves proves nothing and is counted apart rather than mixed into the total. Issuers are aggregated so a single issuer behind many attestations is visible. Direction can be received (attestations about this address) or issued (attestations this address made about others). Available on Base, Ethereum, Optimism, Arbitrum and Sepolia. Nothing here says an issuer is trustworthy: that judgement stays with the caller.
- POST /v1/onchain-identity
Lease a provider-backed inbound SMS number for five minutes, poll its OTP messag…
Creates a five-minute inbound SMS lease through a configured licensed provider, polls received messages, and releases the number upstream on cancellation, expiry or failed x402 settlement. Twilio is supported directly; an HTTPS bearer-token lease provider can also implement the documented generic contract. Messages and lease metadata are removed after expiry. mode=sandbox exists only for payment and client integration tests: its documented Twilio test number is not connected to the telephone network and cannot receive third-party OTPs. Live mode fails without charging when no provider is configured. Callers must confirm authorization and remain responsible for third-party terms, consent and lawful use; this endpoint does not bypass account, identity, rate or abuse controls.
- POST /v1/sms-receive
What its catalog declares
From the ARD catalog this host publishes at
/.well-known/ai-catalog.json. The operator controls every entry; agenttru.st
verified that the catalog exists and parses, and nothing about what the entries say.
HALOWERK identwerk MCP server
MCP server (streamable HTTP) of the HALOWERK service at ident.halowerk.com. Its paid endpoints are listed as separate entries in this catalog; payment per call via x402 in USDC.
https://ident.halowerk.com/.well-known/mcp.jsonName Resolve
Forward resolution takes a name and returns the address it points to, plus the resolver and the owner. ENS names resolve on Ethereum, .base.eth on Base, .sol through the Solana name service. Reverse resolution takes an address and returns its primary name — and always verifies it by resolving that name forward again, because a reverse entry can be set by anyone and is worthless as identity until the forward record agrees; a mismatch is reported rather than hidden. Paid per call via the x402 protocol in US
Multisig Inspect
Reads a Safe from the public transaction service and returns what decides whether it can act: the owner set, the threshold, the current nonce, any enabled modules and the guard contract, and the master copy version. Queued transactions are listed with the confirmations they already carry and the number still missing, so it is visible which of them are one signature away from executing. Paid per call via the x402 protocol in USDC (HTTP 402); no API key or account.
Aa Simulate
Validates a UserOperation structurally and against chain state. It computes the required prefund from the gas limits and fee fields, reads the sender deposit on the EntryPoint and, when a paymaster is set, that paymaster deposit and stake, and says plainly whether the operation is funded. The nonce is read from the EntryPoint and compared with the one supplied, so a stale nonce is caught before submission. Paid per call via the x402 protocol in USDC (HTTP 402); no API key or account.
DAO Snapshot
Reads a Snapshot space and returns what a voter or an observer needs to act. Per proposal: the choices with their scores and share, total voting power cast, the leading option, the number of voters, the quorum and whether it is met, when voting closes and how much time is left. Scores are marked final or pending — Snapshot computes them asynchronously, and a pending score can still move, so a result read too early is not a result. Paid per call via the x402 protocol in USDC (HTTP 402); no API key or accou
Onchain Identity
Reads Ethereum Attestation Service records for an address and sorts them by what they are actually worth. Each attestation carries its issuer, schema, decoded field values, issue time and expiry. The result separates four states that look identical in a raw list: currently valid, revoked by the issuer, expired, and self-issued — an attestation someone wrote about themselves proves nothing and is counted apart rather than mixed into the total. Paid per call via the x402 protocol in USDC (HTTP 402); no API
And 1 more entry in the catalog, not shown here.
Technical agent card
Copied from the agent's card. The operator controls these values; agenttru.st has not verified them.
- Protocol
- a2a
- Version
- 1.0.0
- Card completeness
-
a2a.proto v1.0 requires eight top-level fields. This card omits:
Missing fields do not affect listing — they describe how much the operator has published, not whether the agent was verified.
View all card details
- Capabilities
- pushNotifications stateTransitionHistory streaming
- Agent card
- https://ident.halowerk.com/.well-known/agent-card.json
Operate this agent and would rather not be listed? Request removal.